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Definitions of Some Terms: 
*Note: these will also be defined as they appear in the project.  This guide is intended as a 
reference. 
 
Should-E: ‘Should’ in the epistemic sense.  The epistemic norm tells us to seek true beliefs and 
avoid false ones.  Thus, if one ‘should’ do X in the epistemic sense, it means that doing X would 
help one acquire true beliefs and avoid false ones. 
 
Should-M: ‘Should’ in the moral sense.  The moral norm tells us to do things that are morally 
right and to not do things that are morally wrong.  Thus, if one ‘should’ do X in the moral sense, 
it means that it would be morally right for them to do X; this is the same as saying “one ought to 
do X.” 
 
iPeer: Intuiting-peers.  Two people are iPeers iff they are both capable of having moral 
intuitions. 
 
iPeer Disagreement: The problem of intuiting-peer disagreement.  I argue that we cannot trust a 
particular moral intuition if it is not the case that a large percentage of people share that intuition, 
because given the contrary (intuitive divergence) we will be unable to differentiate between 
unreliable iPeers and reliable ones and thus must take any beliefs based on those intuitions to be 
defeated.    
 
Intuitions: Our gut-reactions or initial feelings about a claim. 
 
General moral intuitions: the set of all moral intuitions; I argue that they are largely unreliable. 
 
Near-consensus intuition: An intuition that is widely shared by most intuiters.  For an intuition 
to be a near-consensus intuition, a certain percentage of people must intuit that it is true.  What 
exactly that percentage is is a question for epistemologists, but it must be well above 50%, and 
does not have to be 100%.  If I had to guess, I’d say it’s about 85%.   
 
Judgment: A belief about a claim that is arrived at by means of our rationality; a belief that 
involves our ability to reason logically. 
 
Rationality: Our ability to reason logically.  The process of rationality is what is involved in 
moving from premises to conclusions in arguments; it is our ability to recognize whether claims 
follow from other claims, or are more likely to be true in light of some evidence, and so on. 
 
A-intuition: An intuition for which there is a credible underlying evolutionary explanation. 
 
B-intuition: An intuition for which there is no credible underlying evolutionary explanation. 
 
R-intuition: A claim that is justified solely by appeal to our intuitions.  I would argue that it is an 
R-intuition that morality exists, which is to say, prima facie, that we should-E believe that there 
is such a thing as right and wrong actions.  A claim is an R-intuition iff it is a near-consensus B-
intuition. 
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Rational judgment: A claim that is ultimately justified by appeal to both R-intuitions and the 
process of rationality.  A claim can be demonstrated to be a rational judgment in multiple ways: 
one, it can be shown to logically follow from an R-intuition; two, its negation can be shown to 
conflict with an R-intuition; three, it can be shown to directly entail from the truth of another 
rational judgment (A) and rational judgment A follows from the truth of an R-intuition; four, its 
negation can be shown to conflict with another rational judgment (A) and rational judgment A 
follows from the truth of an R-intuition; five, it can be shown to directly entail from the truth of 
another rational judgment (A) and rational judgment A follows directly from the truth of another 
rational judgment (B) and rational judgment B follows from the truth of an R-intuition; and so 
on… 
 
R-idea: A claim that is either an R-intuition or a rational judgment.  It is sometimes unimportant 
to identify precisely how a claim gets its justification, as the argument in question works 
regardless of whether the claim is an R-intuition or a rational judgment, so I will refer to some 
claims as being simply ‘R-ideas.’ 
 
Hidden Intuition:  An intuition that is reliable but isn’t an R-intuition.  It is “hidden” in the 
sense that such intuitions are likely to exist but will be overlooked by my method of reflective 
equilibrium. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this project, I seek to an answer to the question of whether the correct ethical 
framework is a deontological or consequentialist one.  I begin with the assumption that morality 
is objective.  Using that as a starting point, I discuss the two primary sources of data on moral 
topics: our intuitions and our judgments.  I note some epistemic worries with regards to our 
moral intuitions, and argue that the process of arriving at judgments—rationality—constitutes a 
reliable process.  Then, I argue for a method of doing ethics known as “reflective equilibrium,” 
which I modify in light of some concerns about the reliability of our intuitions and judgments.  
Next, I apply the method of reflective equilibrium to the deontology/consequentialism debate, 
and conclude that consequentialism is the correct ethical framework. 
 
I. ON THE RELEVANCY OF OUR MORAL INTUITIONS 
Before proceeding, I would like to make an important distinction between the notion of 
an intuition and that of a judgment.  By ‘intuition’ I am referring to the initial compulsions we 
have regarding possible answers to various questions that are in some sense prior to argument 
and reasoning.  For instance, consider the following scenario, presented by Peter Singer in his 
article “Ethics and Intuitions.”1   
Mark and Julie are brother and sister and on a summer vacation in France. One night, they decide that it 
would be interesting to try and make love. They use two forms of birth control, they both enjoy the sex and think 
that it has brought them closer together, but they decide never to tell anyone about it and also never do it again. 
The reaction of disgust that is typically engendered by this scenario captures what I am referring 
to by ‘moral intuition.’  The average person, confronted with this scenario, would immediately 
react by condemning the actions of Mark and Julie as wrong; indeed, I did so myself when I first 
read it.  Our intuitions are somewhat akin to our gut reactions to claims or thought 
Schultz	  p.	  6	  
experiments—they are our initial inclinations to think or believe something about an idea that 
occur separately from our rationalizations about that idea.   
 Our rationalizations, on the other hand, refer to what I have termed our ‘judgments.’  
Judgments are beliefs that we form by means of our rationality, and can easily diverge from our 
intuitions.  Imagine for a moment that when you initially examine the scenario with Mark and 
Julie, you have the moral intuition that the sex act was wrong for them to perform.  However, 
after thinking about the scenario, you recognize that their actions have almost assuredly caused 
net positive utility (they have a stronger bond as siblings; Julie will not get pregnant and produce 
a genetically malformed child; they both enjoyed themselves; there is no risk of a future 
performance of the act; nobody else will hear about it and react with disgust) and then conclude 
that their action was morally right.  That conclusion is what I term a ‘judgment’—it is an idea 
that is produced by means of reasoning and thought, and does not arise on a purely instinctive 
level.   
While in the above scenario the judgment and intuition I mentioned involved different 
answers to the question of whether Mark and Julie did something wrong, our judgments and 
intuitions do not always diverge, and different people do not always have the same intuition or 
judgment on a given topic.   Some people will certainly have the judgment that what Mark and 
Julie did was wrong; for example, they might think, “What they did makes me feel disgusted, so 
I clearly have the intuition that what they did was wrong. Since trusting my intuitions constitutes 
a reliable process for producing true moral beliefs, I conclude that what they did was indeed 
wrong.”  On the other hand, although likely rare, it is possible that someone will have the 
intuition that what Mark and Julie did was right. 
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In this section, I will argue that, generally speaking, our moral intuitions are not reliable 
indicators of moral truth and thus should-Ea be given little evidentiary weight, and then I will 
argue that the process of reasoning, and using our rationality, is a reliable process for producing 
true moral beliefs.  However, this does not imply that all of our moral intuitions should-E be 
ignored when evaluating moral theories—I will argue in the following section that there is a 
small subset of moral intuitions that we should-E take to be reliable.  Additionally, that our 
rationality constitutes a reliable process does not imply that all our judgments should-E be 
involved in our evaluations of moral theories; even if the process itself is reliable, it can still be 
led astray if it is applied to unreliable premises.  Later on in this project I will delineate the 
conditions required for a judgment to be considered reliable under my methodology.   
 
 There are a few different reasons for thinking that moral intuitions are unreliable.  One 
involves a problem similar to that of peer disagreement in epistemology.  In polling a variety of 
people, we would expect a good amount of variation in their intuitive reactions to various moral 
questions or scenarios.  For such variant intuitions to be epistemically fruitful (i.e. for them to 
give us evidence for thinking that some related moral claim is true), we need a way of 
eliminating a good amount of the divergence between intuiters by labeling it as coming from an 
unreliable source, and for the remaining intuitions to widely converge on the answer to some 
candidate moral question.  For instance, assuming for a moment that moral intuitions are 
generally reliable, it is clearly unhelpful to a seeker of ethical truth to discover that, on the 
question of whether action X is right to perform, half of the general population intuits ‘no’ and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a Should-E means ‘should’ in the epistemic sense.  The epistemic norm tells us to seek true 
beliefs and avoid false ones; thus, if one ‘should-E’ do X, then doing X would help one acquire 
true beliefs and avoid false ones. 
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the other half intuits ‘yes.’  In order for the seeker to gain good evidence in favor of an answer to 
the question of whether action X is right to perform, he needs to narrow the set of intuiting 
individuals to a set that is both more reliable and more convergent around a specific answer.  To 
successfully do so, he would need to find a good way of distinguishing between the intuitive 
reliability of sets of individuals and also hope that, after eliminating any data from those found to 
be “less reliable,” there is a sufficient level of convergence around a particular answer for him to 
be justified in believing that answer.  What such a level of convergence might be is certainly 
above 50% (we should-E do better than chance in deciding what to believe), but it might also 
need to be much higher (although that is a question for another paper).   
It is very difficult to distinguish between the reliability of individuals when it comes to 
their moral intuitions, because it is not apparent that things like intelligence or level of 
information have a clear role to play in making such intuitions more likely to be true.  Moral 
intuitions are akin to our pre-rational gut reactions to scenarios or moral ideas, leaving little role 
for intelligence to play; furthermore, while I have noticed that my judgments on moral questions 
have changed as I have gained in my total information on moral subjects, the same cannot be 
said of my moral intuitions: those have remained relatively stable, I just have afforded them less 
weight.  If this phenomenon applies to many others who study ethics, which I expect it might, it 
gives us further reason for thinking that our level of information on moral topics also has little 
bearing on the general reliability of our moral intuitions.  So our seeker of moral truth needs to 
discover some other distinctions that have bearing on the relative reliability of an individual’s 
moral intuitions, or else he should-E accept this problem of “iPeer disagreement”b involving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
b I do not want to label this problem just “peer disagreement,” because ‘peer’ is an epistemic 
term that refers to people with roughly equal intelligence, attentiveness, and level of information 
on a given topic, whereas I have just argued that intelligence and information levels do not have 
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divergent moral intuitions as a defeater for the justification of any moral beliefs that are based in 
intuitions that do not have near-consensus support within the general intuiting community.  I 
doubt that our seeker of moral truth can successfully differentiate between the reliability of the 
intuitions of enough iPeersc to successfully surmount this problem.  As such, even if there are 
some moral intuitions that stem from reliable sources, we have a (potentially insurmountable) 
epistemic problem in that we are unable to adequately distinguish the reliable intuitions from the 
unreliable ones.  It follows that all but “near-consensus intuitions” (i.e. intuitions that are shared 
by a significant percentage of iPeers) should-E not be used as evidence in favor of a related 
moral proposition. 
 A defender of the general reliability of moral intuitions might reply to my worries in the 
following way: perhaps in cases where our moral intuitions diverge significantly, we cannot trust 
one set of intuitive reactions over another and thus we find any moral beliefs on such cases 
defeated (assuming that they rest substantially on intuitive reactions for their justification).  
However, not all cases involve divergent intuitions, and there might even be a large number of 
moral questions for which there is a preponderance of convergent intuitions as to what the right 
answer to the question is.  For example, most iPeers have intuitions that comport with the 
proposition that murder is wrong.  So in all such near-consensus cases, we are justified in 
believing that the near-consensus answer is the correct one solely because the vast majority of 
iPeers intuit that it is so. 
 In light of this objection, a challenge still remains for the defender of the reliability of 
moral intuitions.  This challenge involves a historically popular set of thought experiments that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
much bearing on the reliability of an individual’s intuitions.  So I will refer to “peers” in terms of 
intuition-reliability as “intuiting-peers,” abbreviated using the more hip locution “iPeer,” and 
will term to the epistemic problem discussed here “iPeer disagreement.” c	  Two people are iPeers iff they are both capable of having moral intuitions.	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philosophers have referred to as the “trolley problem,” which I will argue demonstrates that our 
near-consensus intuitions are prone to inconsistency and thus, prima facie, should-E be taken to 
be unreliable.  
Phillippa Foot presented the first version of the trolley problem in a 1976 article about the 
Doctrine of Double Effect.2   The Doctrine of Double Effect is used to determine the moral status 
of actions that involve both good and bad effects.  Foot motivates belief in the Doctrine by 
claiming that there are two cases that can be properly distinguished only by appeal to the 
Doctrine, which essentially holds that it is always wrong to do a bad act intentionally in order to 
bring about good consequences, but it is sometimes permissible to do a good act despite knowing 
that it will bring about bad consequences.  The second case that Foot presents as part of her 
argument has spurred a lot of contemporary moral thought, and it runs as follows: 
A runaway trolley is barreling down a track, and at a fork there are 5 people working on one side and 1 
person working on the other.  The trolley is headed for the side with five people, but a lever can be pulled to switch 
the trolley’s path. Either path chosen by the controller will result in the death of all the workers on that side of the 
track.  The controller of the trolley can decide whether or not to switch the track, killing one to save 5. 
Foot thinks that the Doctrine of Double Effect successfully interprets this case, which I will call 
Trolley, by providing justification for the most common intuitive reaction that people have when 
presented with the case: that the controller should-Md switch the track, killing one to save five.  I 
will assume that this intuition is a near-consensus intuition (i.e. a sufficiently large percentage of 
people have this intuition) for the purpose of this argument.  Bolstering my assumption here, a 
2006 survey of some 60,000 subjects spanning 120 countries indicated that about 90% of people 
intuit that it is permissible for the controller to switch the track in Trolley.3  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
d ‘Should’ in the moral sense. The moral norm tells us to do things that are morally right and to 
not do things that are morally wrong.  Thus, if one ‘should-M’ do X, that implies that it would be 
morally right for one to do X; this is the same as saying “one ought to X.” 
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 The case that has often been paired with Trolley is called Footbridge.  Footbridge runs 
something like this: 
A runaway trolley is barreling down the track, and further down the track there are 5 people working.  You are 
standing on a footbridge overlooking the track, and in front of you is a very large man who is bending over the 
railing and watching the trolley advance.  There are no other people around, and you have the option of pushing the 
fat man into the path of the trolley, killing 1 to save 5 (he is large enough to disrupt its momentum completely), or 
doing nothing, allowing the 5 workers to die. 
The most prevalent intuitive reaction to Footbridge is that you should-M not push the fat man 
into the path of the trolley, and I take Footbridge, like Trolley, to be a near-consensus case.  
Here, data also indicates that about 90% of people have the intuition that you should-M not push 
the fat man, so this again seems like a good assumption.3  These same findings (that 9/10 people 
have what I’ve termed the ‘near-consensus’ intuitions in Trolley and Footbridge) were also 
replicated in a separate poll presented in an episode of RadioLab.4 
 Trolley and Footbridge present a challenge for the defender of the reliability of moral 
intuitions.  Since they constitute near-consensus cases, the defender wants to say that both of the 
predominant intuitions are correct—it is right to switch to the track with only one worker in 
Trolley, and wrong to push the fat man in Footbridge.  The challenge is for our defender to 
identify a morally relevant difference between the two cases that can justify the claim that it is 
morally right to kill one to save five in Trolley and morally wrong to do so in Footbridge.  I will 
argue that no such difference between the cases is present, and consequently our near-consensus 
intuitions are sometimes inconsistent and thus, ceteris paribus, near-consensus intuitions should-
E not be construed as reliable. 
 To motivate my claims here, I will explore some candidate morally relevant differences 
between Trolley and Footbridge and explain why I do not find them compelling.  The first is that 
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in Trolley the controller is not physically touching the person that he kills, but in Footbridge you 
physically shove the fat man to his death. However, imagine two scenarios in which a moral 
agent, let’s call him Dwight, is murdering Jim.  Both scenarios are identical except for the fact 
that in scenario 1, Dwight kills Jim by strangling him, and in scenario 2 he kills Jim by shooting 
him in the head with a shotgun.  If physical touching constitutes a morally relevant difference, it 
seems as though Dwight’s action in scenario 1 is morally worse than Dwight’s action in scenario 
2, but this is clearly not the case.  Hence, it is entirely unintuitive to think that physical touching 
constitutes a morally relevant difference between the cases. 
 Before proceeding, I would like to note a potential objection to the reasoning I just 
employed in the previous paragraph.  One might claim that if I am arguing against the reliability 
of moral intuitions, I cannot justifiably take our intuitions to be good evidence for the proposition 
that Dwight’s action in scenario 1 is not morally worse than Dwight’s action in scenario 2, as it 
seems as though I have just done.  However, I think that this objection is unproblematic because 
either the objection does defeat my argument here and hence our near-consensus intuitions are 
unreliable (as that is an assumption involved in this objection), or else it does not apply and I do 
have good evidence for claiming that Dwight’s action in scenario 1 is not worse than his action 
in scenario 2, and my argument can proceed unhindered. 
 A second proposal for a morally relevant difference between Trolley and Footbridge is 
that all six workers in Trolley are to some degree “in harm’s way,” whereas the fat man cannot 
be so construed.  It is important to note that without any intervention by the controller in Trolley 
the solitary worker would not be harmed; however, there might be something to the idea that the 
worker in Trolley is in a situation where it is more likely that he will be killed in a trolley 
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accident than the fat man in Footbridge, and as such he is more “in harm’s way” than the fat 
man.   
 This “in harm’s way” proposal also seems wrong.  Imagine Dwight again murdering Jim, 
this time by poisoning a greasy cheeseburger that Jim is eating.  In scenario 1, Jim has really 
high cholesterol and as such is at an increased risk of heart attack (especially when he eats greasy 
foods like his daily cheeseburger).  Dwight successfully poisons Jim’s cheeseburger and kills 
him.  In scenario 2, Jim does not have high cholesterol and thus is not as likely to die just from 
eating a cheeseburger.  Jim bites into the greasy treat and subsequently dies—Dwight 
successfully poisoned it and killed him.  Does Dwight’s action in scenario 1 seem less bad than 
his action in scenario 2?  Clearly not: he murders Jim in precisely the same way in both 
scenarios.  But in scenario 1, Jim was more likely to be killed from eating a cheeseburger than he 
was in scenario 2, antecedent to any action by Dwight.  If our intuitions here are reliable (and if 
they are not, then my ultimate claim is proven nonetheless) then being “in harm’s way” cannot 
count as a morally relevant difference between the Trolley and Footbridge cases. 
 A third proposal for a morally relevant difference between Trolley and Footbridge 
involves the Doctrine of Double Effect itself.  In Trolley, the controller is not intending to kill 
the solitary worker as a means for achieving the desired result (saving the lives of the five 
workers), but rather that event is a foreseen but undesired and unnecessary consequence of 
achieving that result.  (It is unnecessary in the sense that all that is required for saving the five is 
a diversion of the trolley; if the one somehow avoided his death by, say, getting off the track 
before the diverted trolley hits him, his miraculous survival would not subsequently cause the 
five to die).  In Footbridge, on the other hand, your pushing the fat man constitutes using his life 
as a means for achieving the desired result of saving the five other workers.  While one might 
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claim that his death is also unnecessary and undesired for achieving that result—after all, you 
would be perfectly content if his body successfully disrupts the motion of the trolley without 
killing him—a philosopher like Foot would note that pushing him into the path of a runaway 
trolley is “close enough” to killing him that we can reasonably understand your action to involve 
using his life as a means for achieving the desired result.  (Additively, his death is “necessary” 
for realizing the good outcome because if the fat man somehow avoided his collision with the 
trolley then the five would die.)  Consequently, we can understand your action in Footbridge as 
“aiming” at the death of an innocent person, which is distinct from our understanding of the 
controller’s action in Trolley.    
 To determine whether this last proposal can justify our intuitions in Footbridge and 
Trolley, I would like us to consider another example that has its roots in Foot’s article, which I 
will call Cave.  A fat man is leading a group of five people out of an ever-narrowing cave, and 
gets stuck, trapping the group behind him inside the cave.  Water levels inside the cave are 
rising, and to avoid drowning the people inside have only one option: blowing up the fat man 
with a stick of dynamite.  Now imagine two scenarios.  In scenario 1, the fat man’s head points 
out towards the exit, and as such he will not drown with the rest of the group and will eventually 
get out alive if he is not blown up with the dynamite.  In scenario 2, the fat man’s head points 
into the cave and so he will surely end up dead: either he will drown with the rest of the group or 
they will blow him up and escape.  Now, regardless of one’s intuitive reaction as to what the 
group should-M do in scenario 1, it seems clear that most people would find that they should-M 
blow up the fat man in scenario 2…after all, the fat man is going to die anyway, so the rest of the 
group might as well survive the ordeal instead of perishing with him.  However, the Doctrine of 
Double Effect would note that in both scenarios blowing up the fat man involves using his life as 
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a means for achieving the desired effect (the survival of the group) and involves the intention of 
killing the fat man.  The Doctrine, if it is to be used to distinguish between the cases of 
Footbridge and Trolley, needs to (at the very least) hold that it is wrong to intentionally kill an 
innocent even if one would save the lives of five others by doing so, and as such it would counsel 
the group in Cave to refrain from blowing up the fat man in both scenarios 1 and 2.  Since the 
predominant intuitive reaction to scenario 2 would be that the group should-M blow up the fat 
man, I find that the Doctrine of Double Effect is inconsistent with our intuitions, and thus either 
our intuitions are unreliable or else the Doctrine of Double Effect is false (and my ultimate claim 
follows either way).    
 One can also argue that the Doctrine of Double Effect is unrelated to the factors that 
actually lead to the differing near-consensus intuitions between Trolley and Footbridge.  Take for 
example ‘Loop,’ another version of the Trolley Problem that runs as follows: 
A runaway trolley is barreling down a track towards 5 workers that are a ways down the line.  Halfway 
between the trolley and the workers is a sidetrack that contains a loop.  The track can be switched to the sidetrack 
such that the trolley goes around the loop before returning to its original track. The controller of the runaway trolley 
notices that there is a fat man in the middle of the loop.  If the controller switches the track such that the trolley goes 
around the loop, it will hit the fat man and halt, leaving the 5 workers unharmed; if he does nothing then the train 
will miss the loop and the 5 workers will die. 
The near-consensus intuition in Loop is that the controller should-M switch the track, using the 
fat man’s life as a means for saving the five workers.  Given that result, it can be said that most 
people find little moral difference between the cases of Loop and Trolley, even though the fat 
man’s death is necessary for achieving the good result in Loop, whereas the death of the one is 
not necessary for achieving the good result in Trolley.  This finding would indicate that, in 
Footbridge, the use of the fat man’s life as a means for achieving the desired result is not what 
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leads most people to intuitively condemn pushing him in front of the trolley.  It is more likely 
that the differences of physical touching or being in harm’s way are what led to that intuition—
but as we have already seen, those differences are not morally relevant.  Thus, Loop can be 
understood as another thought experiment that undermines the intuitive support for the Doctrine 
of Double Effect. 
 
 Three proposals for distinguishing between Trolley and Footbridge—physical touching, 
being in “harm’s way,” and using an innocent person’s life as a means for achieving an end (i.e. 
intending to kill an innocent person)—have all failed to justify our seemingly inconsistent 
intuitions between the cases.  However, these three proposals do not constitute an exhaustive list 
of all the possible morally relevant differences between Trolley and Footbridge.  Other proposals 
might point to differences in physical distance, notions of responsibility, or something else 
entirely.  However, I am not seeking to definitively answer the classic “trolley problem” here, 
but merely to demonstrate that the onus is on the defender of the reliability of our moral 
intuitions to solve the dilemma—because as far as I can tell, there is no morally relevant 
difference between the cases which can serve to justify the near-consensus intuitions that the 
controller’s action in Trolley should-M be to switch to the track with one worker and that your 
action in Footbridge should-M be to refrain from pushing the fat man.   
I would also note that any future proposal for a morally relevant difference between the 
cases would not only need to demonstrate why that difference should-E be construed to have 
moral relevancy, but also (and this is an even more difficult challenge) needs to explain why it is 
of such great moral relevancy that is can switch the moral status of the “killing-one-to-save-five” 
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action between the cases.e  Clearly, the common intuiter would construe a single life to be a very 
valuable thing, and thus the lives of five people to be even more valuable… so whatever 
proposal a defender of the reliability of our moral intuitions comes up with would need to 
involve a difference that has clear and substantial intuitive significance, enough to make it so that 
the preservation of one life becomes the moral imperative, even when the actor might preserve 
five lives by taking the one.  That no such proposal has been discovered after a fair bit of 
examination indicates, to me, that such a difference is simply nonexistent, and so I conclude that 
Trolley and Footbridge demonstrate that some of our near-consensus intuitions are inconsistent.  
The finding that even near-consensus intuitions can be unreliable counts as a further strike 
against attaching evidentiary weight to our moral intuitions.   
 
Thus far, I have argued that our moral intuitions are unreliable, in part because of the 
divergence of moral intuitions in many cases and in part because they can lead us astray even in 
near-consensus cases.  The other side of this argument, and the final nail in their coffin, is to 
provide an explanation for why moral intuitions are unreliable.  If we are able to provide a 
compelling explanation for why they are unreliable, then I think that we have sufficient evidence 
for claiming that we should-E not grant our moral intuitions much evidentiary weight.  For this 
explanation, I turn to an argument presented by Peter Singer in his article “Ethics and 
Intuitions.”5   
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  To illustrate my point here, consider two scenarios in which Dwight murders 100 people.  In 
the first, he does so just for fun.  In the second, he does so in order to save the life of his 
daughter.  While his difference in purpose is (intuitively) morally relevant, it is also clearly 
insufficient for switching the moral status of Dwight’s action: he committed moral wrong in both 
scenarios.	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Singer argues that our moral intuitions are, in a sense, the byproducts of evolution.  If 
Singer is correct, then such a finding would demonstrate that our moral intuitions are unreliable. 
This is because evolution tracks what I call the “gene survival norm,” and the gene survival norm 
and the moral norm are not coextensive.  If we assume that our moral intuitions are 
evolutionarily engendered, then the sorts of intuitions that we would tend to develop over time 
would be ones that facilitate our survival and reproduction in whatever cultural environment we 
are living in—in that sense they follow the gene survival norm.  Furthermore, any ideas or 
actions that tend to help us (individually) survive and reproduce are not necessarily identical to 
the ideas or actions that are morally right for individuals to have or do.  I can think of many cases 
in which it is obviously wrong for someone to perform an action even though that action is 
clearly in the interest in terms of their survival or reproduction—in fact, evolution shaping our 
moral intuitions might even be responsible for a large amount of the human vice of selfishness.   
As an extreme example, imagine that Michael has a gun to his head and is facing a button 
that, if pressed, would launch a nuclear warhead that will blow up the city of Manhattan.  If 
Michael does not push the button, then the gunman will kill him.  Thus, Michael can choose to 
persist by pressing the button and launching the missile that will blow up Manhattan (which, 
assuming that Michael has no blood relatives there, is what the gene survival norm would tell 
him to do), or he can choose to be shot with the understanding that Manhattan will not be blown 
up.  Even though it is not in his interest in terms of genetic reproduction, the better thing for 
Michael to do is—clearly—to allow himself to be killed.  Cases like these motivate the claim 
that the gene survival norm and the moral norm are not coextensive.  
 So what reasons do I have for thinking that our moral intuitions have their origin in 
evolution?  Singer’s argument, which I support, runs something like this.  First off, it seems to 
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explain the shape of many of our intuitions.  Take, for instance, the fact that the average person 
loves his own children more than his cousins, and his cousins more than strangers.  Singer 
claims, and reasonably so, that genes that lead to these forms of love are more likely to survive 
and spread among social mammals than genes that do not.  This same idea would also explain 
why we sometimes experience revulsion when hearing about people who neglect their own 
children to the point of death, but tend not to feel such revulsion towards people that fail to 
donate money that could prevent the starvation of children in third world countries.  Generalizing 
from these explanations, I think that we can come up with a compelling evolutionary story 
behind many of our more commonly shared moral intuitions, which lends credence to Singer’s 
claim—that our moral intuitions do indeed have their origin in our evolutionary history. 
 The second part of Singer’s argument is to note that we share some moral compulsions 
with other species, like monkeys and chimpanzees.  As one example among many, take the 
moral intuition that we should-M repay favors.  Singer describes studies done on monkeys that 
have found that when a monkey picks out another’s parasites, if the other fails to return the 
service then they are often attacked.  The prevalence of seemingly moralistic behavior in animals 
presents us with a possible connection between human features of morality and features of the 
social structures of animals.  Hence, the seeming existence of basic moral intuitions or 
compulsions in other less advanced biological species, and the fact that those compulsions 
clearly facilitate the survival of those species, serves as another piece of evidence in favor of an 
evolutionary explanation for the origin of our moral intuitions.   
 The final, most convincing piece of evidence presented by Singer for the influence of 
evolution on our moral intuitions involves his discussion of the results of fMRI experiments 
conducted at Princeton by Joshua Greene.  These experiments involved brain scans of people 
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pondering over the dilemmas presented in the Trolley and Footbridge thought experiments.  The 
results of the imaging studies confirmed what Greene had hypothesized at the beginning of his 
research—the people who were asked to make a moral judgment in the Footbridge case showed 
more activity in parts of the brain associated with emotion, and those who were asked about 
Trolley had more activity in parts of the brain associated with logical reasoning.  Furthermore, 
Greene found that the few who considered it right to push the fat man in Footbridge took 
significantly longer to reach this judgment than those who answered that it would be wrong to do 
so, presumably because they were forced to reason beyond their primitive, biologically driven 
moral intuitions.  These sorts of results demonstrate the connection between our brain and our 
moral intuitions in a way that would indicate that our moral intuitions are evolutionarily 
engendered.  
The best explanation for all these pieces of evidence—the general comportment of our 
moral intuitions with explanations about what would have been in our evolutionary interest 
throughout our ancestral past, the existence of similar moral compulsions in other species, and 
neurological findings which tie intuitive judgments to the structure of the brain which is involved 
in processing emotion—is that evolution has played a significant role in the origin and 
development of our moral intuitions.  However, this explanation also indicates that our moral 
intuitions are “tainted” by their connection with the gene survival norm—and, as such, cannot be 
taken as reliable indicators of moral truth. 
The epistemic consequences of the unreliability of our moral intuitions will be more fully 
discussed later on, but it certainly has a large influence on how we should-E seek moral truth.  It 
seems as though we need to move beyond our moral intuitions if we are to come to a firmer 
understanding of morality.   
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The second claim that I am going to argue for in this section is that our rationality—our 
ability to reason logically—is an epistemically reliable process.  Recall my earlier 
characterization of judgments: that they are the products of rationality, and can (but do not need 
to) diverge from our moral intuitions.  Unlike moral intuitions, they are going to involve beliefs 
for which people can more easily provide explanations.  While I would not claim that, prima 
facie, the content of any judgment is itself reliable (since it is not just a product of rationality but 
also is dependent on the propositions from which it is “reasoned,” and thus also depends on the 
reliability of those propositions), I am claiming here that the process of rationality is itself a 
reliable process.  This would entail, for instance, that if we arrive at judgments by means of 
reasoning from certain “foundational propositions” about morality that we take to be intuitively 
true, those judgments are not reliable since our intuitions are not reliable indicators of moral 
truth, but if we are able to discover foundational propositions about morality that we should-E 
believe to be true then we should-E believe the judgments that follow from those propositions. 
Before proceeding, I want to consider an important objection to my claim that our 
rationality constitutes an epistemically reliable process.  All of the following claims are likely 
true: we can come up with a good evolutionary explanation for the development of our ability to 
reason, certain species of animals exhibit behavior that indicates that they have some reasoning 
ability, and there is neurological evidence that our reasoning abilities are connected to our brain 
development.  If these kinds of claims undermine the reliability of moral intuitions then why are 
they not concerning for the reliability of our process of rationality?   
The reply is that it is not epistemically worrisome for the process of rationality to track 
the gene survival norm, unlike our moral intuitions.  For our reasoning capacity to be 
evolutionarily advantageous, and thus for it to develop to the extent that it has throughout the 
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development of our species, it needs to reliably get us to knowledge about the way the world 
actually is.  Imagine an ancient tribe of humans at war with another tribe.  In order for the 
members of one tribe to survive and pass on their genes, they need to emerge victorious.  In 
terms of achieving this goal, it certainly helps a tribe if they have the ability to out-strategize and 
outmaneuver the other tribe… but that is only possible if the tribe members have reasoning 
capacities that can reliably get them to judgments that are correct about the way the world 
actually is (for instance, where the other tribe is likely to plot an ambush, or position their 
warriors, or what weapons they will be using).  The correspondence theory of truth understands 
truth to be determined by the way the world actually is—and the way the world actually is is 
exactly what our process of rationality needs to be good at getting us to in order for it to be 
evolutionarily advantageous.   
My argument here can be boiled down thusly: either our ability to reason is evolutionarily 
engendered or it is not.  If it is not, then the epistemic worry about moral intuitions does not 
apply to our rationality, and thus it can be fairly construed as reliable.  If, on the other hand, it is 
evolutionarily engendered, then our rationality is an evolutionarily advantageous trait.  If our 
rationality is an evolutionarily advantageous trait, it is because it does a good job of helping us 
arrive at propositions that correspond to how the world actually is.  But the correspondence 
theory of truth defines truth as propositions that comport with how the world actually is.  So if 
our rationality is evolutionarily advantageous, then it must do a good job of helping us get to 
truth.  If our rationality does a good job of helping us get to truth, then it is a reliable process.  So 
regardless of its origin, it follows that our rationality indeed constitutes a reliable process. 
I would also add that this argument does not apply to moral intuitions because the claim 
‘if our moral intuitions are evolutionarily advantageous then it is because they do a good job of 
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helping us arrive at propositions that correspond to how the world actually is’ is false.  Our moral 
intuitions are advantageous because they led our ancestors to make judgments that facilitated 
communitarian living regardless of whether those judgments were objectively true or not.  For 
instance, it helps a community survive and procreate if its members have beliefs that lead them 
to favor their own community members over members of rival communities and if they think 
that their kids and neighbors deserve special moral consideration over strangers and foreigners, 
but such beliefs fly in the face of candidate objective moral truths like “all human beings have 
equal moral weight.”  However, it does not help those communities survive if their reasoning 
capabilities consistently fail to lead to beliefs in propositions which correspond with the way the 
world actually is, which is why the reliability of the process of rationality is preserved even if it 
is the byproduct of evolution.   
One might object that it would theoretically help communities survive if our reasoning 
capabilities strengthened our beliefs in the sorts of moral propositions that are supported by our 
moral intuitions; hence, it also seems as though our rationality could be evolutionarily 
advantageous without being good at getting us to truth.  While this objection is certainly 
plausible, it ignores the fact that in most domains of life our rationality would be 
disadvantageous if it did not engender judgments that comport with the way that the world 
actually is, which means that if it were not on the whole “truth-conducive” then overall 
rationality would not be evolutionarily advantageous and thus would likely not have developed.  
For instance, if we historically were unable to reliably reason about what sorts of tracks are fresh 
and indicate the presence of nearby prey, we would have been poorer hunters—as often chasing 
after animals that have long since disappeared as those that were actually nearby.  If we were 
unable to reason about how our companions were using language, we would have had a much 
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harder time coordinating actions with other humans during group hunts, in battle, or while setting 
up social institutions that facilitated community survival.  The potential examples here are 
endless—clearly, the evolutionary advantage underlying our rationality lies in it being 
efficacious in getting us to truth. 
A much more interesting objection is that our rationality has led us to all sorts of different 
and even contradictory claims throughout human history.  One merely needs to survey a sliver of 
the field of philosophy to find a wide range of disagreement about the truth of various 
judgments.  I think that this objection essentially boils down to the epistemic problem of peer 
disagreement: the idea that a judgment is defeated whenever someone with an equal level of 
information, attentiveness, and intelligence on a given topic disagrees with that judgment.  Since 
this phenomenon occurs frequently (and across a host of topics), it seems as though most 
philosophical beliefs will lack justification.  However, I doubt that this problem defeats my claim 
that rationality constitutes a reliable process.  I think that a lot of the variance in the judgments 
that issue from the use of rationality can be explained by appeal to things like informational 
inputs from unreliable sources (i.e. our moral intuitions), variations in information levels, and 
differences in intelligence; thus, we do not have to construe this variation as an indication that 
our process of rationality is itself unreliable—not to mention the fact that peer disagreement may 
not be as big of a concern in the future once more knowledge has been accumulated.  For 
example, I have argued that our moral intuitions are unreliable, which would explain some of the 
variation in the judgments made by various moral philosophers (as instantiations of cases in 
which the philosophers applied their reason to information which was itself derived from an 
unreliable source, our intuitions).  Furthermore, Singer himself notes in “Ethics and Intuitions” 
that many of the previous great moral philosophers did not have access to technology that made 
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things like neural imaging possible; advancements in technology have assuredly (if not steadily) 
increased our information levels throughout history, meaning that the information that we are 
able to apply our reason to has both grown in some areas and gotten more precise in others.  
Since more reliable information would make our judgments more likely to be true, we would 
expect there to be a measure of variation between judgments made by philosophers that not only 
have different levels of information than their contemporaries, but also for there to be variation 
between philosophers over time.  Given these separate influences on the content of our 
judgments, it seems as though one can coherently absorb this objection and still claim that our 
rationality does constitute a reliable process.  After all, if one were under the influence of 
Descartes’ Evil Demon, the fact that the content of most of one’s judgments is likely to be false 
is not good evidence for thinking that the use of our rationality is itself unreliable: the trouble 
clearly comes from the source of the information that we apply our reason to.   
Hence, I submit that our rationality constitutes a reliable process.  Furthermore, if we take 
care to examine our sources of information carefully, and select only foundational beliefs that we 
should-E believe (which we can then build on by means of our rationality, much like how 
mathematics takes foundational claims and uses them to prove other related claims), I think that 
we can construe the content of our judgments to be reliable as well—in part because this is the 
best we can do in the search for truth.  After all, we do not have access to the information that 
will come to light in the future, so the best we can do is use whatever we have now.  And if “the 
best we can do” is insufficient for claiming that our beliefs are justified, then the very project of 
ethical philosophy is doomed, at least at this point in time.  But since the very project of ethical 
philosophy is not doomed at this point in time,f it follows that the content of our judgments can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
f I’m just going to stipulate this, because the alternative is abhorrent. 
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be taken to be reliable so long as we satisfy ourselves as to the reliability of certain foundational 
beliefs. 
 
II.  ON THE CORRECT METHOD FOR SEEKING MORAL TRUTH 
 I have argued that our moral intuitions are largely unreliable, and that the content of 
judgments can be construed to be reliable so long as the judgments are grounded in reliable 
foundational beliefs.  Next, I will argue that the methodology we should-E apply for seeking 
moral truth is the reflective equilibrium approach, as it is explicated by Sandberg and Juth in 
their article “Ethics and Intuitions: A Reply to Singer.”6   
 The other half of Singer’s “Ethics and Intuitions,” after he argues (as I have) that our 
moral intuitions are unreliable, is a rejection of the reflective equilibrium method of doing ethics.  
Singer characterizes this method as a search for the theory that best fits both our “considered 
moral judgments” and our “prior moral judgments” (i.e. what I have termed our “judgments” and 
our “moral intuitions”).  However, he thinks that any method of doing ethics that judges a 
normative theory in part by the extent to which it matches our moral intuitions is fundamentally 
flawed—as we do not have good reasons for thinking that our moral intuitions are reliable in the 
first place; as such, there is no point in trying to make sure that our moral theories fit with our 
moral intuitions whatsoever. 
 At the end of his essay, Singer notes a difficulty with his argument: it seems as though 
without intuitions, we can go nowhere.  This seems right.  A belief in consequentialism must 
rest, fundamentally, on our intuitions—but how can someone like Singer be a consequentialist 
and yet reject our moral intuitions as unreliable?  Singer notes that we might try to distinguish 
our immediate emotional responses and our more reasoned conclusions, which is what I have 
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done in drawing the distinction between our moral intuitions and our judgments.  Singer sees this 
distinction as the “only way to avoid moral skepticism.”  
 However, I am not inclined to agree: if all moral theories must rest on some sort of 
fundamental intuition, then we need to make a sort of foundationalist claim about the process of 
doing ethics if we are to avoid moral skepticism—that there are some kinds of moral intuitions 
that are justified even though, generally speaking, moral intuitions are unreliable.  Judgments can 
only get us so far, as even if the process of reasoning is itself reliable, the process needs to get its 
initial data from somewhere.  And if the initial data is itself unreliable, the content of our ensuing 
judgments will be no better (remember Descartes’ Evil Demon).  Thus, some moral intuitions 
need to be taken as reliable if one is to develop a moral theory.   
 Sandberg and Juth mention a similar idea in their article.  They note that while Singer is 
correct in that basing ethics solely on moral intuitions is problematic, basing it solely on ‘reason’ 
gives rise to similar problems.  As such, the best solution would be to strike a balance between 
the two, which is what they see as being, fundamentally, the method of reflective equilibrium.   
 To motivate their claim that basing the search for moral truth solely on reason is 
problematic, they point to Kant, as he produced the “most systematic normative ethical theory 
from the basis of pure reason in the history of philosophy,” (2011: 219) and yet his categorical 
imperative is plagued with endless counterexamples that make it unpalatable as a theory.  They 
also note a commonality between Kant’s normative theory and Singer’s own preference 
utilitarianism—both are supposed to follow naturally from the universal nature of morality, and 
yet are widely divergent theories.  Thus, either the reasoning employed by Kant or Singer is 
defective, or their theories are in some way reliant upon (faulty) moral intuitions after all.   
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 I think that, regarding the above disjunctive, it is the latter: both theories are in some way 
reliant upon moral intuitions.  Even if the theories are supposedly derived from pure reason, the 
reasoning has to begin with some sort of proposition that is simply taken to be intuitively true.  
Thus, I agree with Sandberg and Juth that our judgments can only get us so far: the development 
of a moral theory requires that we start somewhere, and that somewhere has to be some sort of 
moral intuition.  For no matter the power of our reason, even the very idea that morality exists 
stems in part from our intuitions, as it is not an observable phenomenon (even if you witness a 
brutal murder, you are not going to have a sensory experience of wrongness).  However, I do not 
think that this development necessarily leads us to a form of reflective equilibrium under which 
all our moral intuitions have to be given some weight when evaluating various normative 
theories, which is how Singer seems to construe the method, but rather to a form similar to what 
Sandberg and Juth propose at the end of their article.g   
 Sandberg and Juth look for a possible distinction between moral intuitions that would 
allow us to claim that some are relatively more reliable than others.  Such a distinction would 
allow us to incorporate only the former into the reflective equilibrium equation and thus, in a 
sense, “get the best of both worlds”—a methodology that asks moral theories to fit with our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
g Sandberg and Juth also talk about the possibility of a coherentist view of moral justification in 
which there is no individual statement or principal that must be true, as opposed to the 
foundationalist account that requires the grounding of moral theories on certain “foundational” 
intuitions.  While the question of whether foundationalism or coherentism about moral 
justification is correct is outside the scope of this project, I will proceed under a foundationalist 
approach for practical purposes… a coherentist argument would simply be too monumental a 
task, as it would require an evaluation of the coherency of consequentialism and a comparison 
between both it and deontology.  However, I think that my argument will have merit under either 
approach, since if coherentism is true then I can be seen as simply detailing the overall 
coherency of the consequentialist’s framework; the missing piece is just an evaluation of its level 
of coherency vis-à-vis deontology’s.  Also relevant is Sandberg and Juth’s claim that, under the 
coherentist’s version of reflective equilibrium, consequentialism has been explicitly defended as 
the most superior reflective equilibrium.   
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reliable moral intuitions and also comport with our judgments that are based on those reliable 
intuitions.  The distinction they settle on is between the contentious cases and the “obvious, non-
problem” cases… such as the intuition that the conductor should-M throw the switch in Trolley.  
However, I think that this distinction is going to fail, as the mere fact that an intuition is almost 
universally shared and regarded as true gives us insufficient reason for establishing it as 
reliable… it still may well be evolutionarily engendered.   
 The correct distinction between intuitions that we can consider prima facie reliable and 
those we cannot is first going to draw a line between moral intuitions that can be explained in 
evolutionary terms (which I’ll call A-intuitions) and those that cannot be explained so easily 
(which I’ll call B-intuitions).  Once that distinction has been drawn, we then want to apply 
Sandberg and Juth’s distinction to separate B-intuitions that are contentious from B-intuitions 
that are widely intuited to be true (so as to avoid the problem of iPeer disagreement).  The B-
intuitions that are widely regarded as true can then be justifiably construed as prima facie 
reliable moral intuitions, since they are both “near-consensus” and free from the worry about 
evolutionary engenderment.  I’ll call these kinds of intuitions R-intuitions.  It follows that any 
claim is an R-intuition iff it appropriately relies on our intuitions for its justification, which is to 
say that it is a near-consensus B-intuition that the claim is true.  Any moral intuition that is not an 
R-intuition cannot be construed as reliable, given both the epistemic concerns discussed earlier 
regarding moral intuitions that are evolutionarily engendered and the epistemic concerns 
involving iPeer disagreement.  With the distinction between R-intuitions and all other moral 
intuitions in hand, we can now construct a reflective equilibrium methodology that can be used 
to discover moral truth that circumvents both Singer’s earlier worries about the method and 
Sandberg and Juth’s concerns about a methodology that relies solely on judgments.   
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 The methodology that I will use throughout the final sections of this project is as follows: 
we search for R-intuitions, apply our rationality to them, and discover what judgments ensue 
from the various R-intuitions.  Whatever judgments follow from R-intuitions I will term rational 
judgments, and we can justifiably consider rational judgments to be reliable, just like R-
intuitions.  Consequently, we will evaluate various moral theories based on their comportment 
with these rational judgments and R-intuitions.  The ethical framework that we should-E believe 
to be true is that which fits all rational judgments and R-intuitions the best, relative to other 
frameworks.  And as I will eventually argue, that framework is consequentialism (at least as 
compared to deontology).  This methodology is what I will heretofore understand as the method 
of reflective equilibrium. 
 Later on in this project, we will encounter claims for which it is unclear whether they are 
R-intuitions or rational judgments grounded in R-intuitions, since it is ambiguous whether they 
rely on our intuitions for their justification or if they rely on our faculty of rationality as applied 
to R-intuitions for their justification.  (Remember, R-intuitions are prima facie justified because 
they are near-consensus B-intuitions; rational judgments are prima facie justified because they 
are judgments that ensue from a reliable process [rationality] as it is applied to R-intuitions.)  
However, since the method of reflective equilibrium demands that a moral theory comport with 
both R-intuitions and rational judgments grounded in R-intuitions, it will not always matter that 
we draw this distinction explicitly.  So at times I will simply refer to some claims as R-ideas, an 
R-idea being a claim that is either an R-intuition or a rational judgment. 
 
 Sandberg and Juth demonstrated that a methodology that relies purely on our judgments 
is flawed, and Singer showed us that we should-E not evaluate moral theories purely on the basis 
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of their comportment with our moral intuitions.  Consequently, if we are to avoid moral 
skepticism, we need a methodology that can circumvent the concerns of Sandberg and Juth as 
well as Singer.  As I have designed it, our method of reflective equilibrium does exactly that, and 
since moral skepticism is false, I would also argue that it is the correct method for seeking moral 
truth (or at least close enough to the correct method that it can be construed as a reliable method 
for seeking moral truth).h   
 
III.  REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN PRACTICE: DEONTOLOGY? 
 The question immediately becomes what intuitions, if any, are R-intuitions.  The first 
moral intuition that I propose is an R-intuition is that morality is universal: that whatever moral 
imperatives exist, they apply equally to all moral agents, and all moral agents are of equal moral 
importance.  I will call this intuition the universal intuition.  (I label it an R-intuition because I 
think it is justified just by appeal to our moral intuitions, which separates it from rational 
judgments; it is justified because—as I’ll presently argue—it is a near-consensus B-intuition). 
 The universal intuition is a B-intuition (it cannot be easily explained in evolutionary 
terms).  In fact, it seems to lie in direct conflict with the sort of communitarian living that our 
ancestors engaged in.  In order to survive in most places on Earth, humans would need to favor 
their own communities far more than the communities of “outsiders,” so that they would be more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
h The correct method would also capture in its net those moral intuitions that are reliable but are 
not R-intuitions (as it seems likely that there is at least one such intuition).  However, since we 
do not have good distinguishing reasons that can separate these “reliable” intuitions from the rest 
(for instance, how can we distinguish the moral intuitions that really are evolutionarily 
engendered from those that are not but still have a plausible evolutionary explanation attached to 
them?), we cannot, in our current state, justifiably construe any but R-intuitions to be reliable.  
Thus, the method of reflective equilibrium that I have described here is “the best we can do” with 
the information that we have, and so in that sense is the correct one, but is not the best method in 
the theoretical sense.   
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willing to commit violence in order to capture or defend scarce resources and territory.  
Additionally, it also helps a human pass on their genes if they tend to attach more moral 
significance to their own children than to other people.  Since the universal intuition clashes with 
these evolutionary drivers, it is a B-intuition. 
 The universal intuition is also widely intuited to be true; in fact, it seems clear that the 
onus is on the objector to explain why some humans do not count as much as others, morally 
speaking.  While one might at first object that serial killers, for instance, do not count as much as 
other humans, one can still easily explain why we should-M punish serial killers even if they 
count as much as other humans by appealing to justifications like incapacitation, deterrence, or 
rehabilitation.  One such justification runs as follows: in the case of the serial killer, removing 
him from society and depriving him of his freedom might be equivalent to doing something bad 
to him, but allowing him to roam free would be equivalent to causing more overall harm; thus, 
we can justify his imprisonment even if we allot him equal moral weight by simply pointing to 
the notion that his life is not as important as the lives of multiple others.  Since the only potential 
reason for thinking that we should-E find that serial killers do not have as much moral value as 
other moral agents is to enable us to justify their punishment, but we can still justify their 
punishment without construing them as having less moral value as another person, it is not the 
case that we should-E find that serial killers do not count as much as others and this objection 
fails.  
Thus, we have discovered our first R-intuition, the universal intuition.  Under the method 
of reflective equilibrium, we construe this intuition to be prima facie reliable, and can demand of 
candidate moral theories that they comport with it.  For example, if a moral theory would tell us 
that, ceteris paribus, our race, our nation, our neighborhood, or even our family is inherently 
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more important than any other race, nation, neighborhood, or family, then it should-E be 
rejected.  This does not necessarily mean that we should-M not favor our own family over other 
families, but it does mean that, for example, if there is only one food source left in the world, 
then all things equal your family does not have any more claim to the food source than another 
family.  A credible moral theory might still claim that there are good reasons for favoring one set 
of individuals over another set, but it cannot claim that a set of individuals qua a set of 
individuals is inherently special.  Put another way, if theory X says that we should-M favor set A 
over set B because set A has special property P* and set B lacks P*, then theory X must also say 
that we should-M favor set B over set A if it were the case that set B had the special property P* 
and set A lacked P*. 
  
Next, I would like to apply the moral knowledge obtained thus far to the deontology-
consequentialism debate.  As I see it, this debate hinges primarily on whether the moral status of 
an action is determined by the type of action it is, or by the kinds of consequences it produces.  
Imagine two scenarios.  In scenario A, Jim goes home and says five Hail Mary’s after he 
promised Dwight that he would not say any (for a trivial reason).  In scenario B, Jim goes home 
and says five Hail Mary’s, but made no such promise to Dwight.  There are no other differences 
between the scenarios, and the way the future unfolds is exactly the same between them.  While 
the typical consequentialist theory would find no morally relevant difference between the two 
scenarios, the typical deontological theory would condemn Jim’s action of saying five Hail 
Mary’s in scenario A but not in scenario B, since in scenario A Jim “broke a promise,” which is 
an action-type (i.e. he performed an action that is an instantiation of promise-breaking).   
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I think that most people would have the moral intuition that “promise-breaking Jim” in 
scenario A did something morally worse than non-promise-breaking Jim in scenario B.  Indeed, 
if I had to actualize one of these scenarios, I certainly feel more inclined towards scenario B.  
However, as we have seen, the presence of a moral intuition is not any indication of the actual 
truth of the matter.  And indeed, I think it is very clear that the intuition that it is wrong to break 
a promise is not an R-intuition, as it has clear evolutionary relevancy.  Communitarian living 
requires cooperation and coordination among community members, and keeping promises 
facilitates continued cooperation whereas breaking promises makes it more difficult.  If our 
ancestors tended to feel some sort of special compulsion towards keeping their promises, it 
seems as though their communities, in the long run, would do better.  As such, I do not think that 
our moral intuitions regarding promise breaking give us a reason for favoring either a 
deontological or consequentialist approach, since they are not R-intuitions and thus do not play a 
role in our reflective equilibrium methodology.   
Now, some people might be skeptical about how these kinds of moral intuitions are 
supposed to be developing evolutionarily.  I would like to note that I am not necessarily claiming 
that it is hardwired into our brains that promise breaking is wrong.  It also seems possible that 
our parents inculcate a lot of our moral intuitions during our childhood.  However, I think that 
such inculcation is just as much of an atavistic process, since the types of things we teach our 
children are likely to have come from things that we were taught by adults that were influential 
in our lives, and the same goes for those influential adults, and so on.  Where did these didactic 
compulsions about promises come from in the first place?  I would point to human ancestry, 
which found certain types of actions useful to their communitarian lifestyle, and either developed 
a physiological compulsion towards promise keeping or instilled a psychological one during their 
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offspring’s development (which led to their offspring instilling the same kinds of values in their 
progeny, and so on).  Whichever mechanism drives the presence of particular moral intuitions 
does not much matter for my general argument against their relevancy—if they develop out of 
evolutionary usefulness then they track the gene survival norm, not the moral one.  
The sort of argument I just gave against the relevancy of our moral intuition that we 
should-M keep our promises has deep implications for some of the arguments against 
consequentialist theories.  In his “Ethics and Intuitions,” Singer notes that the chief weapon of 
opponents to utilitarianism involves examples that are intended to show that utilitarian claims 
clash with near-consensus moral intuitions.  For example, consider an argument advanced by 
Fred Feldman in Chapter 4 of his Introductory Ethics, which I will refer to as the “Desert Island” 
case:7 
A grandpa and grandson crash onto a desert island, and the grandpa is approaching death.  Before he 
passes, the grandpa asks to be buried as his final dying wish, and the grandson promises to do so.  But the grandson 
would get more utility by using his grandpa’s body as bait for fishing, so he does that instead.  Most people find that 
the grandson’s actions are morally wrong, contrary to the judgment of a utilitarian. 
While I certainly agree that most people would find that it is wrong for the grandson to 
use the body as bait for fishing, I do not think that their finding is good evidence that it is 
actually wrong for the grandson to do so.  People’s judgments regarding this case are generally 
influenced by their intuition that it is wrong to break promises, and since this intuition is not 
reliable, neither is the ensuing judgment that is based on this intuition.  I also think that the 
strength of the typical intuitive reaction to this case helps my general argument against the 
reliability of moral intuitions.  If our intuition that it is wrong to break promises were 
evolutionarily engendered, we would expect to find a stronger compulsion against promise 
breaking in cases that involve people like family members or loved ones than in cases that 
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involve acquaintances, strangers, or even enemies, since promise keeping is going to be more 
useful (in evolutionary terms) when it involves individuals that are closer to us than with less 
distant members of our communities, or even members of other communities.   
Imagine another case, which I’ll call the office case.  
 Andy, Gabe, and Erin all work together and are not related.  Andy and Erin used to date, but they broke up 
about a year ago.  Gabe and Erin have been dating for the last six months, until about two days ago, when Erin broke 
things off with him as well.  Gabe is very distraught, and nearly inconsolable.  He corners Andy in a conference 
room, and pleads with him to not get back with Erin.  Andy promises Gabe that he and Erin will never date again.  A 
few months pass, and Andy realizes that Erin really is the girl for him, and they get back together, contrary to the 
wishes of Gabe. 
I would bet that most of us do not find the act of promise breaking in the office case to be as bad 
as that in the desert island case.  I propose that this is for a few different reasons.  One is that the 
promise breaking act in the office case does not involve a family member, but rather mere 
acquaintances, and so the intuitive compulsion we have against the breaking of the promise is not 
as strong (which matches with my earlier prediction, and lends credence to the evolutionary 
explanation for our intuitions about promises).  The other is that there is no dead body that is 
being fished with in the office case, an idea that itself creates a feeling of revulsion.  But our 
revulsive sentiments are also evolutionarily engendered; they tend to relate to things that would 
have direct negative impacts on our health such as consuming human bodies, feces, or spoiled 
foods.  Both of these reasons indicate that our stronger intuitive reaction in the desert island case 
is due to differences that have a clear relation to our evolutionary history, further indicating that 
our intuitive reactions to these cases are grounded in our inherited traditions or traits.   
The fact that our moral intuitions about promises are unreliable indicators of moral truth 
leaves a significant challenge for many deontologists: they now need to motivate the existence of 
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duties against promise breaking without appealing to that intuition, because we should-E not 
believe that a duty exists without some good reasons for thinking that it exists.  Of course, not all 
deontologists believe that there is such a duty against promise breaking, but for now we will 
restrict this argument to those who do.  I do not think that they can motivate the existence of a 
duty against promise breaking adequately because they cannot appeal to the consequences of 
promise breaking (they want to condemn action-types, not action-consequences).  I cannot think 
of any way to motivate claims of the form “actions of type X are wrong” without claiming that 
they produce bad consequences or without pointing to a particular moral intuition involving 
actions of that type.   
So thus far, we have declined belief on the claim that, as an action-type, promise breaking 
is wrong.  Still, it may very well be that some instances of promise breaking are wrong because 
of their consequences (as I will argue later).  But before we get there, I want to make a general 
argument against belief in any deontological theory.   
 
There are many action-types that we intuitively find to be wrong.  Murder, lying, 
breaking promises, cheating, physical violence, and incest are all good examples.  However, 
there are also many theoretical situations in which we would tend to think that a person should-
M perform such actions.  Imagine any sort of “doomsday” scenario in which the Earth gets 
blown up unless Dwight murders Jim, or lies to Jim, or cheats on Angela, or commits incest with 
his mother.  In these kinds of scenarios, most people will think that Dwight ought to do what will 
save the world; namely, murder, lie, cheat, or commit incest.  All deontological theories have 
duties against performing some of these kinds of actions, which is to say that they think we ought 
not perform them.  Either they construe these duties to be absolute (i.e. we should-M never 
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violate these duties), or they construe them as capable of being overridden by other, more 
stringent duties.  I will first argue against what I term absolute deontological ethics, which 
construes these duties to be absolute.  Later, I will argue against “prima facie deontology,” which 
involves duties that are capable of being overridden by more stringent duties. 
Clearly, absolute deontological ethics takes the unintuitive position when it comes to 
these doomsday scenarios—that Dwight should-M not murder, lie, cheat, or commit incest in 
order to save the world.  Sure, an absolute deontological ethics might involve modified (but still 
absolute) duties like “it is wrong to murder someone unless by doing so you save the world,” but 
then these duties are either being modified in light of various consequences (which a 
deontologist should-E not be doing), or else we are now operating in the realm of prima facie 
duties, which I will argue against later on, and so I will not consider these “modified” absolute 
duties as part of my argument against absolute deontological ethics. 
However, even if absolute deontological ethics provides us with unintuitive results in 
some of these doomsday scenarios, the mere fact that a system of morality conflicts with our 
moral intuitions—even strong ones—is insufficient for rejecting it.  If we are to reject absolute 
deontological ethics, we need to show that it conflicts with R-intuitions (or rational judgments, 
which are ultimately grounded in R-intuitions), or else demonstrate that there are no good 
reasons for believing it and then provide a positive argument in favor of another conception of 
morality.  Here, I will do the former; I think that the R-intuitions that absolute deontological 
ethics conflicts with are the universal intuition and the intuition that if something is bad, more of 
it is worse.i  Consider the following case:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i I will not argue extensively that this intuition is an R-intuition, but I think that it is one.  It has 
no clear role to play in human beings’ evolutionary story, and most people would certainly intuit 
that it is true. 
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Angela is in a car.  In the seat next to her is Robert, a (State) Senator.  They are driving towards a political rally 
where Robert is going to tell fifty lies to a crowd in order to help his reelection prospects.  Angela is the only person 
that knows the directions to the rally, and if Robert does not make the correct turn ahead then he will be late and 
someone else will speak instead of him (and this person will tell no lies).  When Robert asks Angela which way to 
turn to get to the rally, Angela thinks about the decision in front of her.  Either she can tell one lie and prevent 
Robert from telling more lies to more people, or she can tell the truth and thus produce a state of affairs in which 
many more lies are told.  Angela has no other options, and cannot prevent the (State) Senator from telling lies by any 
other means.  Angela has no interests in this situation beyond doing what she thinks is best for the world; she wants 
to do whatever is morally right, as far as everyone’s interests are concerned.  She also believes that lying is morally 
wrong, and that it is bad for everyone in the world when the people in it lie. 
Let’s call one possible decision of Angela’s the Deontic Decision, and that’s where Angela 
decides to tell the truth and Robert subsequently tells fifty lies.  The other we will call the Pants 
On Fire Decision, and that’s where Angela tells a lie and Robert misses his engagement at the 
rally.  If Angela makes the Deontic Decision, her reasoning seems faulty for one reason: if lying 
is morally wrong, then why would morality dictate that we cannot lie even if that lie is the only 
way to prevent more lying?j  I propose that the absolute deontologist can give only two replies to 
this question, and each answer conflicts with either the universal intuition or the R-intuition that 
if something is bad, more of it is worse. 
There are just two potential morally relevant differences between the Deontic Decision 
and the Pants On Fire Decision to which a deontologist can point to make their case.  The first is 
that one decision will produce fifty instances of a violative action-type while the other produces 
only one such instance; this is a difference of clear moral relevancy.  But if the absolute 
deontologist points to this difference as an explanation for why it is worse (in his view) for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
j Samuel Scheffler discussed a similar objection to deontology in his book, The Rejection of 
Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral 
Conceptions.  He noted that he finds it paradoxical that it may be wrong to do A even if that is 
the only way to stop several others from doing A.   
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Angela to tell the one lie, then he clearly lies in conflict with the R-intuition that if something is 
bad, more of it is worse.  So he has to turn to the other possible morally relevant difference 
between the Decisions, and note that in Pants On Fire Angela tells a lie herself, but in the 
Deontic Decision she does not tell a lie herself; it is other people that are performing the 
violative action.  But this explanation conflicts with the universal intuition—it only makes sense 
if there is a reason to think, all things equal, that it is better for other people to do a bad action 
than it is for you to do that same bad action (even if they are doing more of that bad action).  If 
the absolute deontologist points to this difference to explain why Angela should-M make the 
Deontic Decision, then they must think that the actions we undertake ourselves are inherently 
special when compared to the actions of others, just because we are the ones performing them.  
Since this thinking runs into conflict with rational judgments that are grounded in the universal 
intuition, it should-E be rejected under our method of reflective equilibrium.    
So no explanation that the absolute deontologist can give will keep his ethics from 
violating at least one R-intuition.  This argument, which was restricted to the absolute duty 
against lying, can be generalized to any candidate bad action that absolute duties forbid us to 
engage in (let’s call the candidate action ‘A’).  If it is morally bad for people to do A, then why is 
it worse to do A to prevent more instantiations of people doing A than it is to not do A and 
produce more instantiations of people doing A?  No matter the action-type selected, the absolute 
deontologist will encounter the same problem: in attempting to answer this question, he will 
invariably come into conflict with either the universal intuition or the R-intuition that if 
something is bad, more of it is worse.  Thus, I find that under our method of reflective 
equilibrium we should-E reject absolute deontological ethics.   
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Since absolute deontological ethics is off-limits, there is only one system of ethics left 
that a committed deontologist can turn to: prima facie deontology.  A prima facie system of 
deontology can accommodate the problem discussed earlier by simply claiming, for example, 
that we have a prima facie duty to not lie, but this duty is capable of being overridden by another 
duty against facilitating the production of lies by others.  It can also provide more intuitive 
answers to the “doomsday” scenarios by claiming that Dwight has a prima facie duty not to 
murder, lie, commit incest, etc., but he also has a more stringent duty against allowing the world 
to be destroyed.  Thus, a prima facie deontologist can coherently claim that Dwight should-M act 
to save the world in these kinds of scenarios.   
One difficulty I have with such a picture of morality is applicable to all deontological 
theories: it really seems as though the reason that things like lying or murdering are wrong lies in 
the effects that these actions have on other moral agents.  Take, for instance, the intuitive 
proposition that some lies are worse than others and some murders are worse than others, even 
when there are no other violative action-types present (i.e. there are some murders that are worse 
than other murders, just based on the presence of other contextual facts that do not themselves 
add up to another kind of violative action).k  This proposition is incomprehensible under any 
deontological system, since actions are wrong only in relation to how they violate duties, and yet 
the consequences of actions seem to be entirely relevant in determining whether an act is better 
or worse than another of the same type.  As an example, contrast Dwight lying to Jim about 
where Jim’s child is just to make him anxious, with Dwight lying to Jim to keep his surprise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
k This qualification is necessary to sidestep the objection that deontological theories can make 
coherent sense of the idea that some actions are worse than other actions of the same type as long 
as the latter involve more duty violations…for instance, they could claim that one act of murder 
is worse than another act of murder if the former act also involved an instance of promise-
breaking and the latter did not.   
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birthday party a secret.  Dwight’s lying in one scenario certainly seems worse than his lying in 
the other, but he violates the same duty in both scenarios and there are no other duties being 
violated; hence, if Dwight’s lying really was worse, it must be in virtue of the consequences 
created by his act. 
A prima facie deontologist has two possible lines of response here.  One is to modify his 
“list” of prima facie duties to include duties that condemn lying to people to make them anxious 
and to exclude duties that condemn lying to people to facilitate birthday surprises (or to include 
such duties but make them less stringent).  Such a modification would provide the necessary 
framework for claiming that one of Dwight’s lies was worse than the other.  However, the 
modification seems ad hoc at best.  Furthermore, consider the fact that we might come up with 
cases like Dwight’s lies for many other purported duties.  If we were to do so, then the number of 
modifications we might demand of the prima facie deontologist, if he wishes to build an intuitive 
theory, extends greatly.  Additionally, since our deontologist would need to motivate the 
existence of every one of his various duties that his theory proposes (since we should-E not 
believe that a duty exists unless we have good reason(s) for believing that it exists), he will have 
a serious problem motivating his theory as a whole if he makes all of these modifications.  
Ultimately, I think that his project will fail because the deontologist will be unable to sufficiently 
motivate the existence of all of his duties, as I will argue later.   
The other response is to simply deny that it matters how we tend to distinguish between 
Dwight’s lies and claim that the lies were both equally wrong, despite our intuitions to the 
contrary.  Of course, the deontologist would also want to make this same claim with regards to 
other kinds of duties, since we can come up with many other cases in the same vein of Dwight’s 
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lies.  Ultimately, this response is also going to severely undermine the deontologist’s ability to 
motivate the existence of his duties (again, as we will see later). 
There are other theoretical concerns that apply more specifically to prima facie 
deontology.  If an ethical system claims that some duties override others, the system is worthless 
unless it can also tell us which of those duties are more stringent and which are less so.  While 
there are clear cases (at least intuitively speaking) such as the duty against lying seeming less 
stringent than the duty against murdering, there are many more unclear ones—is incest as bad as 
stealing?  Is being unfaithful as bad as mugging somebody?  Of course, the prima facie 
deontologist could just make a list of all his duties, ranked by their level of stringency… but any 
reader of his list would want to know why certain duties are ranked above others; what is it that 
really makes (for example) lying worse than breaking a promise?  The prima facie deontologist 
cannot point to the consequences of such actions as an explanation, but in making such a list he 
also cannot point to our intuitions—as no such list is going to be able to make distinctions 
between all of the candidate wrong action-types in a way such that all the distinctions have 
widespread intuitive support.   
 
So, a deontologist of whatever stripe needs to both motivate the existence of his various 
duties and then explain what makes some duty violations worse than other duty violations.  Since 
we have already rejected absolute deontology, we will just focus on how the prima facie 
deontologist might meet these challenges.   
Prima facie deontologists are going to have to draw on our primitive, unreliable moral 
intuitions to motivate the existence of duties.  They cannot point to the consequences of our 
actions.  Perhaps they can derive their ethical systems from R-intuitions, but it is not clear to me 
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how they might do so (Kant’s derivation of the categorical imperative comes close in terms of 
his general methodology, but is obviously false), so I will leave that possibility for another to 
explore; for me, it will suffice if we can derive one ethical system purely from R-ideas.l  And in 
fact, it seems as though many traditional duties do indeed come from our evolutionary impulses. 
Consider a partial list of W. D. Ross’s prima facie duties from “The Right and the 
Good.”8  Keeping one’s promises and not engaging in deception, making up for wrongful 
actions, and not harming others are all on his “list” of prima facie duties.   Intuitively, all of these 
are attractive duties: in typical scenarios, we certainly want people to keep their promises and 
often think it is wrong when people fail to do so (especially when their promises are made to 
us!).  But these are all A-intuitions, which is to say that there are credible underling evolutionary 
explanations for why we have them; communities that believe and enforce these kinds of prima 
facie duties tend to collaborate better and persist longer than communities that do not.  I already 
argued, earlier in this section, that our intuitions about promise breaking are A-intuitions; as 
such, it is impossible to say whether our intuitions regarding promise breaking cut at the very 
joints of moral truth or if they are mere fantasies selected for by the process of evolution.  Hence, 
this A-intuition (and all others) should-E be construed as unreliable.  The other duties listed have 
similar explanations behind them: communities that inculcate peacemaking by means of 
reparative actions tend to be more supporting and tight-knit; communities that have a prima facie 
condemnation for violence (i.e. that tend to disavow violence in cases where there are no 
overriding factors which would more understandably, perhaps even justifiably, drive one to 
commit violence, such as a rival faction’s presence threatening family members or the need for 
territory) are less likely to be torn apart by internal violence.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
l Additionally, it would be quite problematic for my method of reflective equilibrium if we were 
able to derive two. 
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 Since the prima facie deontologist cannot point to consequences, and R-intuitions do not 
lend themselves toward motivating the existence of his duties, he is forced to rely on our moral 
intuitions more generally and so abandons the method of reflective equilibrium.  Not only is this 
a problem given the general unreliability of our moral intuitions, but it also puts our prima facie 
deontologist into a corner with regards to his earlier explanations about what makes some actions 
worse than others of the same type.  He wants his theories to be highly intuitive… more intuitive, 
in fact, than consequentialist theories.  So for Dwight’s lies (and any other case we might come 
up with that leads to a prevalent intuition that one instance of an action of type A is worse than 
another instance of an action of type A), he is going to have to modify his list of duties, as he 
cannot coherently claim that our intuitions about these cases are merely false—which was his 
only other option—since he needs his theory to comport with our general moral intuitions.  He 
will also need to justify the existence of these duties, and lack of such duties in other cases, 
purely by appeal to our intuitions.  This will be difficult, especially when it comes to cases like 
Trolley and Footbridge.  If the prima facie deontologist wishes his theory to match our moral 
intuitions (which itself already seems like a deeply flawed project), he needs to find a morally 
relevant difference between those cases so that he can build that difference into his list of duties 
(as that is necessary for his theory to justifiably claim that the act of “killing-one-to-save-five” in 
Footbridge is morally worse than the apparently identical [in moral terms] act in Trolley).  I will 
leave that challenge open for a prima facie deontologist to attempt, if he is still inclined to do so 
in light of the epistemic worries involved in his abandonment of the method of reflective 
equilibrium. 
 Furthermore, any system of ethics that is based entirely on general moral intuitions is 
doomed to fail one important criterion for deciding between moral theories: that they be action 
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guiding.  A good ethical theory is going to give us, at least on a theoretical level, an answer as to 
what we should-M do across a variety of scenarios.  However, general moral intuitions do not 
converge in enough areas for a theory built entirely around our intuitions to be very action 
guiding, especially in contentious cases.  For instance, is it wrong to get an abortion?  If an 
ethical theory is grounded in our general intuitions, then I do not see how it can possibly give us 
an answer to this question (at least not at this point in time) given the widespread intuitive 
disagreement present on the issue; but of course, given the objectivity of morality, there is an 
answer to this question.m  The failure of such theories to answer these questions counts further 
against all theories that are grounded in general moral intuitions.  (Of course, some deontological 
theories do provide answers to these kinds of questions—I would just argue that such theories 
are even more bereft of good reasons motivating belief in them, for their proponents are not 
grounding their theory’s justification in widespread, near-consensus intuitive support, but rather 
just in terms of comportment with individual or factional moral intuitions—which are even more 
unreliable than moral intuitions taken generally).n 
 So to conclude this section, I would note that we have many good reasons to want to steer 
away from a deontological approach to ethics.  However, these reasons are not decisive unless 
we also have good reasons that positively favor taking a different approach.  Since, as I will 
argue presently, we have reasons for believing that the consequentialist approach is preferable 
under the method of reflective equilibrium, I conclude that we should-E reject deontology. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
m Although it might not be a yes or no answer.  The existence of a true “yes and no” answer that 
specifies certain contexts or conditions under which abortion is permissible and impermissible 
would satisfy the demands of moral objectivity here. 
n Imagine: if our general moral intuitions track the gene survival norm, our individualized 
intuitions are going to track the “random-genetic-mutation norm.” 
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IV.  OR CONSEQUENTIALISM? 
As noted in the previous section, it is an R-intuition that if something is bad, then more of 
it is worse.  I would also submit that the following is an R-idea: some actions are worse than 
others of the same type (and it follows that ‘some actions are worse than others’ is also an R-
idea).  These R-ideas posed serious problems for a deontological approach to ethics, both for an 
absolute deontologist and for a prima facie deontologist, due to the prevalence of cases like 
Dwight’s lies (and their subsequent need to create duties that differentiate between actions in 
pairs of cases that seem to involve actions of the same type, with one being clearly worse than 
the other).  Furthermore, there are larger worries about any ethics project that abandons the 
method of reflective equilibrium for an approach that matches the truth of moral theories with 
their overall comportment with our general (and unreliable) moral intuitions.  
 Since comportment with R-ideas is an important criterion under the method of reflective 
equilibrium, an ethical theory that can, on the theoretical level, both describe and coherently 
explain why certain actions are worse than others of the same type is going to balance out more 
favorably than deontology.  The same goes for the R-intuition that if something is bad, then more 
of it is worse.  I will argue that consequentialist theories can just as smoothly meet the challenges 
posed by these R-ideas as the ideal prima facie deontological theory can, and that they have a 
firmer theoretical foundation on which to stand.  (The ideal prima facie deontological theory is 
the one that best comports with these R-ideas, and it will be the one that contains an extensive 
list of prima facie duties that distinguish between actions in cases like Dwight’s lies.  However, 
such a theory comports with these R-ideas at the cost of a reasonable theoretical foundation, 
since many of the duties on “the list” are going to be completely unintuitive, and their rank-
ordering in terms of stringency will also be both unintuitive and ad hoc).  Additionally, 
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consequentialist theories can also explain why many of the “traditional” deontological duties do 
exist (in a sense), which actually is somewhat important, as I shall argue presently. If all of this is 
true, then it follows that we should-E favor consequentialism over deontology under the method 
of reflective equilibrium. 
Does it matter whether a theory comports with our general moral intuitions?  Even 
though I construe our general moral intuitions to be unreliable, I still think that the answer is yes.  
I will argue for two claims here.  Claim 1: all things equal, theories that better comport with our 
general moral intuitions should-E be favored under the method of reflective equilibrium.  Claim 
2: if that “favored” theory were to conflict with an R-intuition and another theory does not do so, 
then that “favored” theory should-E no longer be favored.   
Claim 1 is true because R-intuitions are reliable but hard to discover.  The line between 
an A-intuition and a B-intuition is a vague one, as is the line between a near-consensus intuition 
and a more divergent intuition.  Since these lines are vague, I have elected to just isolate clear 
instances of R-intuitions from which to build my arguments.  However, this “cautious” approach 
means that the general pool of moral intuitions is likely to include some reliable intuitions that I 
will fail to unearth.  Furthermore, I made the distinction between R-intuitions and the rest of our 
moral intuitions just because R-intuitions are the only sorts of intuitions that I have good reason 
to think are reliable, but there might be other kinds of moral intuitions that are reliable.  For 
instance, there may be some near-consensus intuitions that are not evolutionarily engendered and 
yet there seems like there is a good evolutionary explanation for why they exist; these intuitions 
could be reliable and yet are not R-intuitions.  I will call these two kinds of reliable intuitions 
(those neglected due to my cautious approach, and those ignored because they are A-intuitions 
but aren’t really evolutionarily engendered) “hidden intuitions.” Given the probable existence of 
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hidden intuitions, it appears that general comportment with our moral intuitions should-E count 
in favor of the truth of a moral theory, since it makes it more likely that such a theory comports 
with some hidden intuitions.  
Claim 2 is true because we still need to be cautious about the unreliability of most moral 
intuitions.  Since we have good reasons for thinking that R-intuitions are reliable, comportment 
with them should-E be privileged over comportment with the general pool of moral intuitions.  
The amount of evidence that a high level of comportment with the general pool of moral 
intuitions provides us for thinking that a candidate theory is true is unclear, because we do not 
have any indication about the number of hidden intuitions vis-à-vis the number of unreliable 
general moral intuitions.  Given these sorts of epistemic concerns, I do not think that it would be 
reasonable to privilege a theory with a high level of comportment with our general moral 
intuitions that conflicts with at least one R-intuition over a theory that does not conflict with any 
R-intuitions and yet does not have a high level of comportment with our general moral intuitions.   
It is because of claim 1 that I think that it is of some value that a consequentialist theory 
be able to explain the “existence” (in a sense) of many traditional prima facie duties, given that 
most people intuit that there is at least some truth involved in such duties.  And in fact, I think 
that consequentialist theories can do so.  I will restrict myself to explaining how, under 
utilitarianism, a sort of prima facie duty against breaking promises, lying, murdering, and 
stealing exists, but I think that my explanation is similar to one that can be given by many other 
kinds of consequentialist theories.   
Utilitarianism holds that actions are morally right iff they are available and produce at 
least as much utility as any other available action.  I think that, more often than not, actions that 
are instances of breaking promises, lying, murdering, and stealing will not produce such a 
Schultz	  p.	  50	  
“maximal” utility level.  Imagine that we are firm believers in utilitarianism, and we hear that 
Dwight has broken a promise, but we do not have any other information about what Dwight did.  
Now imagine that we are forced to make a moral assessment of Dwight’s action: we have to 
either say that Dwight acted rightly or that he acted wrongly, all without learning anything more 
about what Dwight actually did.  Since it is true that more often than not, actions that are 
instances of breaking promises produce a utility level that is less than maximal, our best guess 
would be to claim that what Dwight did was wrong.  (This line of reasoning can obviously be 
extended to a case in which we hear that Dwight told a lie, murdered someone, or stole 
something.)  Thus, a proponent of utilitarianism can reasonably believe that it is generally wrong 
to perform actions that are instances of promise breaking, which is a belief that is similar to the 
belief that we have a prima facie duty against breaking promises.  In that sense, a 
consequentialist theory can be said to comport to with our intuitions about the existence of 
certain prima face duties, which counts at least slightly in favor of such consequentialist theories.   
Next, I will argue that consequentialist theories can smoothly accommodate the R-idea 
that if something is bad, then more of it is worse, and the R-idea that some actions are worse than 
others of the same type.  Consequentialist theories take particular consequences of actions to 
have moral relevance, and suggest that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined 
entirely by the sort of consequences that they produce.  For instance, a consequentialist theory 
might claim that the morally relevant consequences of actions are those that increase or decrease 
the total amount of knowledge in the world.  Such a theory could easily accommodate the R-idea 
that if something is bad, then more of it is worse by claiming that producing a net loss of 
knowledge in the world is bad, and the more overall knowledge lost, the worse.  Furthermore, 
such a theory can easily explain why it is worse for more knowledge to be lost: because losing 
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knowledge is bad, so the more knowledge that is lost, then the more badness that exists in the 
world.  (Of course, such a theory needs to motivate why losing knowledge is bad, but we can 
easily see how this R-idea would fit into such a theory, which is what I’m going for.) 
Utilitarianism is another consequentialist theory that can easily accommodate the R-idea 
that if something is bad, then more of it is worse.  Utilitarianism takes the “bad” consequence of 
actions to be pain.  It is obviously coherent for a proponent of utilitarianism to claim that if pain 
is bad, then more pain is worse; hence, the theory easily accommodates this R-idea.  
Utilitarianism also easily accommodates with the R-idea that some actions are worse than others 
of the same type, and it can more smoothly (than deontological theories) provide an explanation 
for why particular actions are worse than others.  Let’s briefly return to the case of Dwight’s 
Lies.  Dwight tells two lies to Jim, but it seems as though one lie was clearly worse than the 
other, even though both lies violate just one duty: the duty against lying.  Utilitarianism would 
analyze the two lies differently: one lie produced anxiety in Jim (since Dwight lied about the 
location of Jim’s child), and since anxiety is a negative emotional state which fits under the 
umbrella term ‘pain,’ it is fair to say that Dwight’s lie produced net pain in the world.  The other 
lie facilitated Jim’s birthday surprise, which we might stipulate that he thoroughly enjoyed, and 
so we can claim that this lie produced net happiness in the world; hence, since one lie produced 
more overall badness than the other lie, it was a worse lie.  So, not only can this consequentialist 
theory give us the sort of results we would expect with regards to the R-idea that some actions 
are worse than others, it can also give us a mechanism for determining whether any candidate 
action was better or worse than another: simply look at the differences in overall utility produced 
by the two actions, and if one action produced less overall utility than the other, then it was a 
worse action.   
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There are other consequentialist theories that both comport with and can explain the two 
R-ideas mentioned here, but I will not talk about any of those—it suffices for this argument that I 
have demonstrated that some consequentialist theories fully comport with these two R-intuitions. 
Next, I will argue that these consequentialist theories have a firmer theoretical foundation 
on which to stand than the only kind of deontological theory that comports with both of these R-
ideas (the “extensive list” prima facie duty theory).  The argument here is simple: a 
consequentialist theory merely needs to motivate the belief that whatever effects of actions it 
construes as having moral relevance (be it the production of utility, knowledge, or something 
else) are indeed good or bad effects.  The extensive list prima facie duty theory, on the other 
hand, needs to motivate belief in the existence of every single one of its purported prima facie 
duties, which is not only a much bigger task but it also a much more difficult one (especially if 
some of these duties need to draw distinctions between the actions involved in Trolley and 
Footbridge, where any potential distinction seems doomed to moral irrelevancy).   Because some 
of these effects are clearly morally relevant (the most obvious being the production of utility), it 
follows that the theoretical foundation for some consequentialist theories is much firmer than 
that for the ideal prima facie duty theory.  
 
In this section, I have demonstrated that consequentialist theories can comport with the 
following two R-ideas: if something is bad then more of it is worse, and some actions are worse 
than others of the same type.  I have argued that consequentialist theories stand on a firmer 
theoretical foundation than the only deontological theory that comports with both of these R-
ideas.  I would submit that, under the method of reflective equilibrium, this demonstrates 
conclusively that consequentialism should-E be preferred to deontology.  The question, at this 
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point, becomes which sort of consequentialism underlies the correct moral theory—but that is a 
question for another project. 
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